State v. Brown Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 40545 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
8-19-2013
State v. Brown Respondent's Brief Dckt. 40545
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Brown Respondent's Brief Dckt. 40545" (2013). Not Reported. 1206.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/1206
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDA 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) No. 40545 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) Kootenai Co. Case No. 
vs. ) CR-2011-18678 
) 




BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
OPY 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
HONORABLE LANSING L. HAYNES 
District Judge 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
DAPHNE J. HUANG 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 




SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate 
Public Defender 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
~COPY 
AUG 1 9 2013 
ATTORNEY FOR 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................. ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1 
Nature of the Case ................................................................................ 1 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings ................................... 1 
ISSUES .......................................................................................................... 3 
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................... 4 
I. Brown Has Failed To Show A Right To Review 
Of The Idaho Supreme Court's Order Denying 
His Motion To Augment In Which, In Any Event, 
The Court Properly Found Brown Was Not Denied 
Due Process Or Equal Protection Rights ................................... 4 
A The Idaho Court Of Appeals Lacks Authority 
To Review The Idaho Supreme Court's 
Decision Denying The Motion To Augment. .................... 4 
B. The Supreme Court Properly Denied Brown's 
Initial Motion .................................................................... 5 
II. Brown Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused 
Its Discretion In Not Sua Sponte Reducing His Sentence, 
Given His Admitted Probation Violations And Failure 
To Comply With Court-Ordered Conditions Or The Law ............ 8 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 11 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ........................................................................ 11 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367 (Ct. App. 2001) ................................................ 6 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585 (1956) ............................................... 8 
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102,117 S.Ct. 555 (1996) ........................................... 8 
State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053 (Ct. App. 1989) ................................................. 6 
State v. Cornelison, 2013 WL 1613842 (Ct. App. 2013) ...................................... 5 
State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 267 P.3d 709 (2011) .......................................... 9 
State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984) ................................................... 6 
State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 218 P.3d 5 (Ct. App. 2009) ............................ 5 
State v. Hayes, 138 Idaho 761, 69 P.3d 181 (Ct. App. 2003) ............................ 10 
State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 264 P.3d 935 (2011) ...................................... 9, 11 
State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 288 P.3d 835 (Ct. App. 2012) .................. 4, 5, 6 
State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900 (1983) ................................................................... 6 
State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977) ................................................................. 6 
State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873,253 P.3d 310 (2011) ............................. 8, 9, 11 
RULES 
I.A.R. 28(a) ........................................................................................................... 5 
ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Eric Brown appeals from the district court's orders revoking probation and 
executing his sentence for possessing a controlled substance, driving under the 
influence, and attempting to elude. Brown argues the court abused its discretion 
in not sua sponte reducing his sentence. Brown also challenges the Idaho 
Supreme Court's order denying his motion to augment the record to include 
transcripts from various proceedings. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Eric Brown pleaded guilty to possessing a controlled substance, driving 
under the influence, and attempting to elude. (R., pp. 22-23.) The district court 
sentenced Brown to a term of four years with two years fixed, but retained 
jurisdiction and recommended placement in the Correctional Alternative 
Placement Program (CAPP). The district court suspended execution of Brown's 
sentence and placed Brown on supervised probation, subject to conditions. (R., 
pp. 41-45.) 
Eleven days later, Brown's probation officer filed a Report of Probation 
Violation (PSI, pp. 47-53.) The report alleged six violations, including failing to 
check in for his week of discretionary jail time, moving without permission, failing 
to report or appear for probation appointments, using marijuana, and absconding 
probation. (Id.) An addendum to the report, filed a month later, alleged two 
additional violations, committing the crimes of carrying a concealed weapon, and 
possessing paraphernalia. (PSI, pp. 55-56.) 
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After Brown admitted violating his probation, the district court entered 
judgment on the probation violation, revoking probation and executing sentence. 
(R., pp. 49-52.) In its order, the district court recommended that Brown be 
allowed to participate in the Therapeutic Community or any substance abuse 
treatment or counseling available through the Department of Correction while 
incarcerated. (R., p. 52.) Brown timely appealed. (R., p. 54.) 
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ISSUES 
Brown states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Brown due process 
and equal protection when it denied his Motion to Augment 
with transcripts necessary for review of the issues on 
appeal? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to 
reduce Mr. Brown's sentence sua sponte upon revoking 
probation? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 3.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Brown failed to show a right to review of the Idaho Supreme Court's 
order denying his motion to augment in which, in any event, the Court 
properly found Brown was not denied due process or equal protection 
rights? 
2. Has Brown failed to show the district court abused its discretion in not sua 
sponte reducing his sentence, given his admitted probation violations and 




Brown Has Failed To Show A Right To Review Of The Idaho Supreme Court's 
Order Denying His Motion To Augment In Which, In Any Event, The Court 
Properly Found Brown Was Not Denied Due Process 
A. 
Or Equal Protection Rights 
The Idaho Court Of Appeals Lacks Authority To Review The Idaho 
Supreme Court's Decision Denying The Motion To Augment 
On appeal, Brown requested transcripts from his December 2011 plea 
hearing, February 2012 sentencing hearing, June 2012 rider review hearing, and 
September 2012 admit/deny hearing. (3/22/13 Motion.) The Idaho Supreme 
Court denied the motion as to all but the September 2012 hearing transcript. 
(4/15/13 Order.) In his brief on appeal, Brown argues that the Court's denial of 
augmentation with these transcripts violates his right to due process and equal 
protection. (Appellant's brief, pp. 5-20.) As an initial matter, if this case is 
assigned to the Idaho Court of Appeals, there is no authority to review the Idaho 
Supreme Court's decision under Idaho case law. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals cannot directly review a decision of the Idaho 
Supreme Court. Rather, it may only grant an independent motion based on new 
information "or a new or expanded basis for the motion." State v. Morgan, 153 
Idaho 618, _, 288 P.3d 835, 837 (Ct. App. 2012). Brown makes clear here that 
he is not renewing his motion, but seeks review of the Idaho Supreme Court's 
denial of the initial motion. (Appellant's brief, p. 4.) Brown has identified no legal 
authority allowing such review by the Idaho Court of Appeals. The Idaho Court of 
Appeals recently rejected an appellant's attempt to seek review of the Idaho 
Supreme Court's denial of a nearly identical issue in State v. Cornelison, 2013 
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WL 1613842 (Ct. App. 2013). If this case is assigned to the Court of Appeals, 
existing case law supports rejection of Brown's argument. 
B. The Supreme Court Properly Denied Brown's Initial Motion 
Even if the Court were to entertain Brown's request for review, Brown has 
failed to show a legal basis to reverse the Court's decision denying the motion. 
Under Idaho case law, Brown's due process and equal protection rights were not 
violated. 
A defendant is denied due process or equal protection if he has been 
denied "a record on appeal that is sufficient for adequate appellate review of the 
errors alleged regarding the proceedings below." Morgan, 153 Idaho at_, 288 
P.3d at 838 (citations omitted). Although the record on appeal is not confined to 
those facts arising between sentencing and the probation revocation appealed, 
id. (citing State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009)), it 
need not include "a// proceedings in the trial court up to and including 
sentencing." Id. (emphasis original). Rather, the appellate court will consider 
those elements of the trial court record relevant to the probation revocation 
issues and that are properly part of the appellate record. l.Q.,_ 
The appellate rules designating those records necessary for appellate 
review afford all process due an appellant. l.Q.,_ at 838-39 (citing I.AR. 28(a), 
29(a), 30). The fact that the appellate court denies an appellant's motion to 
augment does not show a violation of due process. Under Morgan, the appellate 
court need only admit those parts of the record below that were germane to the 
trial court's probation revocation decision. !Q. Specifically, the Morgan court 
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said, "This Court will not assume the omitted transcripts would support the 
district court's revocation order since they were not before the district court in the 
[final] probation violation proceedings, and the district court gave no indication 
that it based its revocation decision upon anything that occurred during those 
prior hearings." J_g. at 838. 
Brown notes that, unlike in Morgan, Brown challenges his sentence, rather 
than the order revoking his probation. (Appellant's brief, pp. 10-11.) On this 
distinction, Brown argues, "the entire record encompassing events before and 
after original judgment" is needed for his appeal. (Appellant's brief, p. 11.) Thus 
Brown asserts that where sentencing is challenged on appeal, the entire record 
of proceedings is relevant as a matter of law. The Morgan court explicitly 
rejected such a proposition. Morgan, 153 Idaho at _, 288 P.3d at 838. And 
importantly, nothing in Morgan indicates its holding applies to appeals of 
probation revocations, but not to appeals from sentencing. 
Arguing that the requested transcripts are relevant, Brown cites Idaho 
cases holding that a court is entitled to use knowledge learned from its official 
position and observations in imposing sentence. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 12-
131 .) Brown asserts that, because the court can use information learned in prior 
proceedings when sentencing a defendant, transcripts of those proceedings are 
relevant. But the mere assertion that the transcripts are relevant does not make 
1 Citing Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 2001); State v. Sivak, 
105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977); State v. 
Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055-
56 (Ct. App. 1989). 
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them so. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 9-16.) Ultimately, Brown fails to provide a 
legal basis for his proposition, but only makes self-serving conclusory assertions. 
Nor has Brown provided a factual basis for his argument. As in Morgan, 
the district court here gave no indication that its decision revoking Brown's 
probation and imposing his sentence was based on information provided in prior 
hearings but not provided in his final disposition hearing. (See 10/19/12 Tr.) 
The transcript reflects instead that the court revoked Brown's probation based on 
information before the court for the final hearing. (10/19/12 Tr., p. 7, L. 22 - p. 
11, L. 16) 
The district court's statement to Brown in his disposition hearing was 
thorough and thoughtful, covering Brown's criminal history, as well as the court's 
memory of Brown's improved demeanor at the June 2012 hearing, then his 
almost immediate probation violations thereafter. (10/19/12 Tr., p. 7, L. 24 - p. 
10, L. 23.) Brown has failed to show a factual basis why the transcripts from his 
December 2011 plea hearing, February 2012 sentencing hearing, and June 2012 
rider review hearing would be in any way relevant on this appeal. 
Absent demonstration that the transcripts are factually or legally relevant, 
Brown cannot show that counsel's ability to provide effective assistance is 
hindered by the Court's denial of augmentation to include the transcripts in the 
appellate record. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 16-18.) Accordingly, Brown cannot 
show that denial of augmentation with the requested transcripts violates his right 
to due process. 
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Regarding Brown's equal protection claim, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
held that the "[d]estitute defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate 
review as defendants who have money enough to buy transcripts." Griffin v. 
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19, 76 S.Ct. 585, 591 (1956). However, the state need only 
provide "adequate and effective appellate review," or those portions of the record 
necessary to pursue the issues raised on appeal. Id. at 20, 76 S.Ct. at 591. An 
indigent appellant has a right to "a transcript of relevant trial proceedings," or a 
record "complete enough to allow fair appellate consideration of his claims." 
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 121-23, 117 S.Ct. 555, 566-67 (1996). 
Because Brown has not demonstrated that the transcripts are relevant to 
the issues here, he also fails to show they are needed for adequate and effective 
appellate review. Accordingly, this Court should find that its initial denial of 
Brown's motion was correct. 
11. 
Brown Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Not Sua 
Sponte Reducing His Sentence, Given His Admitted Probation Violations And 
Failure To Comply With Court-Ordered Conditions Or The Law 
The appellate court will not disturb a sentence that is within statutory limits 
absent a clear showing of abuse. State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 875, 253 
P.3d 310, 312 (2011) (citation omitted). Brown does not dispute that his 
sentence was within statutory limits. (Appellant's brief, p. 19.) In reviewing for 
abuse of discretion, the appellate court considers whether the district court (1) 
was aware its decision was discretionary, (2) acted within the scope of its 
discretion and consistent with applicable law, and (3) reached its decision 
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through exercise of reason. State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834, 264 P.3d 935, 
941 (2011). 
To meet his burden on appeal, Brown must show his sentence is 
excessive "under any reasonable view of the facts," considering the objectives of 
criminal punishment: protection of society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and 
retribution. Windom, 150 Idaho at 876, 253 P.3d at 313. In reviewing an 
excessive sentence claim, the appellate court independently reviews the record, 
examining the nature of the offense, and the offender's character. State v. 
Delling, 152 Idaho 122,132,267 P.3d 709,719 (2011) (citation omitted). Where 
reasonable minds could differ as to whether a sentence is excessive, the 
appellate court will not disturb it. Miller, 151 Idaho at 834, 264 P.3d at 941 
(citation omitted). 
Brown cites, as mitigating factors, his young age, his childhood lack of 
supervision and physical abuse by his father, and his substance abuse and 
mental health problems. (Appellant's brief, pp. 19-20.) These considerations fail 
to demonstrate that the district court's view of the facts was unreasonable, or 
that its sentence was excessive. The district court acknowledged the apparent 
progress that Brown had made between his initial sentencing hearing and the 
rider review. (1019/12 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 5-18.) However, the district court went on to 
note that Brown "barely got out of the courtroom doors before he went off with 
friends smoking marijuana to, quote, celebrate his release from his rider program 
.... " (10/19/12 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 22-25.) 
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The probation officer then gave Brown a chance to correct his misstep 
with "seven days of unscheduled jail time for that just gross violation of 
probation," rather than bringing Brown back to court. (10/19/12 Tr., p. 9, L. 25 -
p. 10, L. 3.) Brown responded by failing to show up for the jail time, then twice 
more failing to report to the probation officer. (10/19 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 5-14; PSI, pp. 
47-49.) As the district court said at Brown's sentencing on the probation 
violations, "within a month of being placed out on [Brown's] probation period he 
more or less absconded from his probation." (10/19/12 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 18-20.) 
And the following month, Brown committed new offenses of carrying a concealed 
weapon without a license and possessing drug paraphernalia. (10/19/12 Tr., p. 
10, Ls. 21-23; PSI, pp. 55-56.) 
The district court noted that the primary consideration in sentencing is 
protection of society. (10/19/12 Tr., p. 10, L. 24 - p. 11, L. 1.) See State v. 
Hayes, 138 Idaho 761, 766, 69 P.3d 181, 186 (Ct. App. 2003). The district court 
expressed, "It is this Court's opinion that society is not adequately protected with 
a probation period." (10/19/12 Tr., p. 11, Ls. 1-3.) Further, given the limited 
space in the retained jurisdiction program, the district court determined the 
program was best reserved "for those individuals who are demonstrating at least 
some indications of being serious about rehabilitation." (10/19/12 Tr., p. 11, Ls. 
6-16.) 
The district court's findings are amply supported, given Brown's admitted 
behavior and refusal to comply following his rider review hearing. Even if this 
Court disagrees with the district court's view of the facts, those findings must not 
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be undisturbed. Miller, 151 Idaho at 834, 264 P.3d at 941. The district court 
acted well within its discretion in executing the previously imposed sentence of 
four years with two years fixed, and recommending treatment and counseling 
programs available through the Department of Corrections. Accordingly, Brown 
has failed to show his sentence is excessive "under any reasonable view of the 
facts." See Windom, 150 Idaho at 876, 253 P.3d at 313. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order imposing sentence, and the Supreme Court's order denying Brown's 
motion to augment. 
DATED this 19th day of August, 2013. 
~~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 19th day of August, 2013, served a 
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a 
copy addressed to: 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the 
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
~ D PH J. HUANG 
DJH/pm 
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